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Dynamic analysis“…we know that hostage takers looking for ransoms distinguish between those governments that pay ransoms and those that
do not, and make a point of not taking hostages from those countries that do not pay.” David S. Cohen, US Under Secretary for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 2012 speech to ChathamHouse
[Callimachi (2014a)]1. Introduction
A three-minute video, released by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on September 14, 2014 entitled “Lend me your ears,
messages from the British detainee John Cantlie,” accurately characterized the differences in the negotiation policies that set
the United States and the United Kingdom apart from their European counterparts in recent years. In the video, Cantlie stated
that “every other European country negotiated with Islamic State and got their people home while the British and Americans
were left behind” (Cantlie, 2014).1 Cantlie's claim is supported by New York Times reporter Rukimimi Callimachi (2014a,
2014b), who indicated that ransoms had been paid to ISIS for the release of Javier Espinosa (Spain); Edouard Elias, Didier François,
Nicolas Hénin, and Pierre Torres (France); Jejoen Bontinck (Belgium); Federico Motka (Italy); and others (also see Mickolus,
forthcoming). Ransoms had been paid by the hostages' home country, his family or employer, or by a third country.2 In fact,620@utdallas.edu (J. George), tsandler@utdallas.edu (T. Sandler).
e has made a number of propaganda videos for ISIS that criticized US and UK actions against ISIS.
o not identify who really paid the ransom; but any payment by private citizens was facilitated by gov-
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Americans, three British, and one Russian held hostage. Three of the American hostages – James Foley, Steven Sotloff, and Peter
Kassig – were beheaded; two of the British hostages – David Haines and Alan Hennings – met the same fate. Kayla Mueller,
the only female American hostage, was allegedly killed by a US drone strike on an ISIS-occupied facility. Sergey Gorbunov, a
Russian hostage, was shot to death by his ISIS captors (Callimachi, 2014b). A similar scenario of beheadings of American
(e.g., Nicholas Berg and Eugene Armstrong) and British hostages (e.g., John Bigley) and release of European hostages
(e.g., Italian Guiliana Sgrena) after ransom payment took place in 2004–2005 in association with kidnappings by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, the then leader of al-Qaida in Iraq (Mickolus, 2008).3
The New York Times also reported that nearly $130 million was paid in ransoms to al-Qaida and afﬁliates between 2008 and
2013, prior to the rise of ISIS. This total included $94.5 million to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), $5.1 million to al-
Shabaab, and $29.9 million to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Countries involved with the payment of these ransoms
to terrorist kidnappers included Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland (Callimachi, 2014a). Other countries alleged
to have paid or facilitated the payment of ransoms to hostage-taking terrorists include Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Sweden (Mickolus, 1993, 2008, 2014, forthcoming; Mickolus and Simmons, 2002, 2006). Despite news reports and corroborating
evidence, countries deny paying ransoms and sometimes disguise the payment as a foreign aid contribution to the venue country
where the hostage is held (Callimachi, 2014b). This denial is not surprising since major Western countries signed a G-8 agreement
in 2013 not to pay ransoms or grant concessions to terrorists who kidnap. The New York Times quoted a high-ranking al-Qaida
ofﬁcial as indicating that currently ransoms fund half of the organization's operating budget (Callimachi, 2014a). These ransoms
allow terrorist organizations to circumvent enhanced post-9/11 efforts to freeze terrorist groups' assets (Enders and Sandler,
2012).
US–UK no-concession policy presents the families of hostages with a terrible reality. Unless their loved ones escape or are
freed in a high-risk rescue mission by special forces, both of which are highly unlikely, the hostages will meet a terrible fate
after a horrible incarceration, combined with mental and physical torture (Callimachi, 2014b, 2014c). Prior to 9/11, US families
had been aided, at times, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to pay ransoms to terrorists to bring their loved ones
home (Callimachi, 2014c). An example is the ransom paid to Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia (FARC) for the release
of US journalist Thomas Hargrove on August 20, 1995; Hargrove had been kidnapped in Colombia on September 23, 1994
(Mickolus and Simmons, 1997). On June 24, 2015, the Obama administration announced that it would no longer prosecute fam-
ilies that paid ransoms to terrorists4; however, the administration reiterated that the US government would not pay ransoms or
grant other concessions to terrorist kidnappers. Since most families do not have the large sums that ISIS and other current terror-
ist groups demand, this policy change should have little or no effect on our ﬁndings in the future. Moreover, our analysis includes
data prior to this recently announced policy change.
Our primary purpose is to apply economic analysis to quantify the verity of the statement by David S. Cohen, given at the start
of the paper. In particular, we want to ascertain how, if at all, the recent no-concession policy of the United States and the United
Kingdom has changed the abductions of Americans and British people by concession-seeking terrorists. Is it true that these terror-
ists have increasingly abducted hostages from known concession-granting countries – i.e., Austria, Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland – which we call the “Concessionaires.”With the help of game theory
and time-series analysis, we offer answers to these questions and indicate why countries are better off not conceding to ransom
or other requests (e.g., a prisoner exchange) despite the terrible costs visited on captured citizens. If adherence to the no-
concession policy really discourages kidnappings, then past sacriﬁces of a few US–UK hostages serve a country's interests by
protecting a greater number of potential hostages. Thus, countries confront a dilemma where the lives of some unfortunate vic-
tims must be weighed against the future well-being of many if the policy is effective. This effectiveness is quantiﬁed in our ensu-
ing analysis. Since the start of 2001, countries that granted concessions encouraged up to 87% additional abductions (above the
median number of kidnappings) of their citizens. In contrast, the median rate of abduction of American and British citizens has
remained essentially unchanged after 2001, given these countries' general adherence to their no-concession policy — i.e., there
is no changepoint after 2001. The past actions of concession-granting countries not only placed more of their citizens in greater
peril, but also put all targeted countries in harm's way by either funding or supporting (from prisoners release) the operations of
terrorist groups. Generally, we ﬁnd that terrorist casualties in kidnappings do not deter future EU and concession-granting coun-
tries' kidnappings during 2001–2013 or the reign of religious fundamentalist terrorists. There is, however, some evidence that ter-
rorist casualties in kidnappings reduce median abductions for the US–UK.
After some necessary preliminaries in Section 2, we sketch a conceptual game-theoretic model of kidnapping in Section 3 that
informs our empirical analysis on past kidnappings. This conceptual analysis indicates that terrorists abduct more hostages from
countries that grant concessions to get their citizens home. Moreover, the conceptual model indicates that enhanced deterrent
measures (i.e., greater protection for potential hostages or rescue missions) that result in terrorist casualties generally discourage
kidnappings unless the terrorists are out for martyrdom or publicity. In Section 4, we describe our unique data set of transnational
terrorist kidnappings for 1978–2013. Section 5 presents the time-series methodology along with the study's key covariates. A
Bayesian Poisson changepoint model is applied to kidnapping time series from three cohorts of countries – the United States
and the United Kingdom, the Concessionaires, and the EU (without the UK) – during 2001–2013. In Section 6, the results show3 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in a US bombing of one of his safe houses on June 7, 2006.
4 See http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/22/hostage-review-will-make-it-easier-for-families-to-pay-ransoms/.
43P.T. Brandt et al. / European Journal of Political Economy 44 (2016) 41–52how the covariates' inﬂuences differ among the three cohorts. Section 7 addresses additional robustness checks using data from
1978 to 2013 and 1978 to 2000. Concluding remarks follow in Section 8.
2. Preliminaries
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants to ob-
tain political or social goals through the intimidation of an audience, beyond that of the immediate victims (Enders and Sandler,
2012; Ezcurra and Palacios, 2016; Hoffman, 2006). Essential ingredients of the deﬁnitions concern the violence, objectives, and
audience. Audience cost results when citizens pressure their government to settle with the terrorists to restore safety (Weeks,
2008). Governments must weigh the costs of holding ﬁrm (e.g., the political fallout from hostages' desperate appeals) against
the costs from caving in to terrorist demands (Sandler and Enders, 2004). The latter may reduce popular support for the govern-
ment, which may lose its subsequent election or encourage additional attacks (Scott, 1991). Since terrorism involves substate ac-
tors, our deﬁnition rules out state terrorism, but does not rule out state-sponsored terrorism.
An important dichotomy distinguishes between domestic and transnational terrorism. The former is homegrown and home-
directed for which the victims and perpetrators are from the venue country, where the attack occurs (Enders et al., 2011; Kis-
Katos et al., 2011). In contrast, transnational terrorism involves victims, perpetrators, or venue from two or more countries. The
kidnappings of US and UK journalists and aid workers by ISIS in Syria represent transnational terrorist incidents. The same is
true of the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl by Harkat ul-Majaheddin on January 23, 2002 in Karachi; he
was later beheaded (Mickolus and Simmons, 2006).
Terrorists employ alternative modes of attacks – e.g., assassinations, bombings, armed attacks, and hostage taking – to pressure
a government to concede to the group's political or social demands. Hostage taking missions – kidnappings, skyjackings, nonaerial
hijackings, and barricade and hostage missions (henceforth barricade missions) – are complex and expensive operations that at-
tract signiﬁcant press coverage when the negotiations drag on and the terrorists are able to release videos or written appeals by
the hostages. Hostage-taking operations are among the most risky and complex terrorist attacks that may, on occasion, yield huge
media and recruitment payoffs as the four 9/11 hijackings demonstrated. Despite the large logistical costs of hostage taking, ter-
rorists engage in such acts if their perceived expected gain warrants it. Wilson (2000) showed that terrorist hostage takers ex-
pend lots of effort in structuring their skyjacking and barricade operations, which were the focus of her study.
Kidnappings differ greatly from the other three types of hostage events, because the terrorists' and their victims' locations are
generally unknown to the authorities. This, in turn, provides the terrorists with a greater sense of security from which to conduct
their negotiations. As such, kidnappings have been found to last longer than other hostage incidents (Atkinson et al., 1987;
Sandler and Scott, 1987). Kidnappings are more prevalent than other terrorist hostage incidents, constituting 73% and 67.6% of
all transnational hostage events during 1978–2013 and 1978–2000, respectively. Previous panel data analyses of transnational
hostage-taking terrorism drew other important distinctions between kidnapping and nonkidnapping hostage actions. In particular,
kidnappings displayed greater logistical success than other kinds of hostage taking (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009). Kidnappings,
where fewer lives are at stake, decreased the likelihood of a negotiation success compared to other hostage incidents (Santifort
and Sandler, 2013).
In a time-series study, Brandt and Sandler (2009) investigated the dynamic behavior of kidnappings, skyjackings, and other
hostage incidents for 1968–2005, prior to the rise of AQIM, ISIS, AQAP, and al-Shabaab. They found that past concessions had
the strongest impact on generating new kidnappings and skyjackings — namely, 2.62 and 0.59 additional attacks, respectively, fol-
lowing successful negotiations. Unlike Brandt and Sandler (2009), the current study is primarily concerned with the contrasting
dynamics of kidnappings since the start of 2001 for alternative cohorts of targeted countries; namely, those that usually do not
grant concessions (the United States and the United Kingdom) and those that often grant concessions (the Concessionaires and
EU without the UK). In particular, we want to quantify how making concessions puts the latter two cohorts in greater jeopardy
of future abductions. We focus on 2001–2013 because the United States and the United Kingdom, especially the former, have
been consistent with their no-concession pledge during this period, so that results with respect to the beneﬁts from not conceding
should be more clear-cut. Moreover, some kidnappers have raised the stakes to the government by resorting to beheadings. To
characterize this recent period better, we also contrast its ﬁndings with respect to negotiation success to those for the
1978–2013 and 1978–2000 periods.
In the current study, we focus on kidnappings rather than other types of hostage taking for a number of reasons. First, by being
more associated with money ransom (Santifort and Sandler, 2013), kidnappings are a better source of funding than other hostage
attacks. Major terrorist groups increasingly rely today on this mode of attack to ﬁnance and publicize their terrorist campaign.
Thus, understanding how to curb the success of such attacks informs governments on how to limit funding for a wide range of
terrorist attacks. Second, kidnappings typically involve a single nationality in terms of victim(s), thereby facilitating conclusions
to be drawn on how concessions affect future abductions of the hostage country's citizens. During 1978–2013, 60% of kidnappings
were associated with a single victim nationality, while only 42% of skyjackings involved a single victim nationality. Third, with the
added security at airports and buildings, kidnappings were now the major component of hostage incidents, constituting 88.9% of
such incidents during 2001–2013. Fourth, kidnappings better allow terrorists than other kinds of hostage-taking incidents to plan
whom to abduct. Mickolus' (1993, 2008, 2014) chronologies provide a rich source of kidnapping descriptions about how terrorists
watch and target speciﬁc victims. In skyjackings and building takeovers, the victims are more random. Fifth, gruesome beheadings
since 2002 underscore the trade-off that some countries must make by staying true to a no-concession pledge. We are particularly
interested in the inﬂuences of two covariates – number of negotiation successes by terrorists and count of kidnappings with
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era.3. A game theory of terrorist kidnappings
We ﬁrst consider a one-shot kidnapping game conceptually.5 The government goes ﬁrst and determines a level of defensive
measures against kidnapping, which ﬁxes the terrorists' perceived likelihood of logistical success or failure.6 Logistical success in-
volves the terrorists securing one or more of their kidnapping victims. When one or more hostages are kidnapped and secured,
the government must then decide whether or not to capitulate to the kidnappers' demands. Partial concessions are possible.
The abduction likelihood depends on the level of defensive measures, the terrorists' perceived probability of logistical success
or failure, their belief about gaining concessions from a government, and their expected payoffs. These payoffs depend on the
gains or losses associated with no abduction, abduction and logistical failure, abduction success and no concessions, and abduction
success and some concessions met. For kidnappings, governments may try to gain a strategic advantage by pledging never to con-
cede or never to allow private parties to concede, so that terrorists are dissuaded from taking hostages (Lapan and Sandler, 1988).
The no-concession pledge may not deter terrorist kidnappers if they believe that the abduction of a sufﬁciently valuable hos-
tage (e.g., an Israeli soldier or a diplomat) will cause the government to renege on its pledge. Thus, a no-concession pledge may
still result in a positive payoff for terrorists on some occasions. Even if the government's pledge never to capitulate to hostage-
taking terrorists' demands is believed, hostages may still be abducted if the terrorists' net gain from logistical failure or negotiation
failure is positive. Martyrdom may provide a positive gain for logistical failure, while kidnap-generated publicity or societal fear
may offer a positive payoff for negotiation failure. Since 2002, societal fear may stem from Internet-posted beheadings of hostages
that make the public acutely aware of the terrorist group's cause and its ruthlessness. Such horriﬁc acts may also result in recruit-
ment of fanatics to the terrorist group (e.g., ISIS). A government's no-concession pledge only stops all kidnappings when the
pledge is credible, the terrorists only gains from granted concessions, and the government's payoff from not conceding is
known (Lapan and Sandler, 1988). The latter means that the value of the hostage(s) is known when the government makes its
no-concession pledge, but this cannot be true so that the government's payoff from holding ﬁrm is uncertain. When, however,
the government's no-concession pledge is not credible owing to frequent past concessions, hostages are abducted if the terrorists'
anticipated gains from concessions (i.e., paid ransoms or released prisoners) are greater than their expected losses from a logis-
tical failure.
A formal model has some comparative statics that lead to some testable hypotheses. First, abductions decrease as a
government's defensive measures increase. These enhanced defensive measures result in terrorist casualties at the abduction
stage or during the incident. Unless terrorists are out for martyrdom, these casualties reduce future kidnappings as operatives
are lost and terrorists' losses from failure are greater. If, however, terrorists value martyrdom, then such casualties may encourage
more hostage taking. Thus, the inﬂuence of terrorist casualties may inhibit or encourage future kidnappings depending on how
terrorists value martyrdom. The same is true of the effect of violent ends (i.e., a shootout with authorities) on future kidnappings.
The next comparative statics results are more clear-cut. Negotiation success on the part of the terrorists results in more future
kidnappings as the expected payoff to terrorists from kidnappings increases. In particular, larger or more frequent ransoms are
anticipated to encourage more kidnappings.
In a multiperiod game, terrorists update their beliefs of future negotiation successes based on the government's past actions
regarding the making of concessions. Each time the government makes concessions or allows others to make concessions, the ter-
rorists raise their anticipated probability of future concessions (Sandler et al., 1983). As this perceived probability of concessions
increases, the terrorists anticipate a greater expected payoff from kidnapping and so there will be more abductions. If, however,
the government does not concede for a given kidnapping, then the terrorists reduce their perceived probability of future conces-
sions, thereby reducing their anticipated gain from future kidnappings. This, in turn, results in fewer additional kidnappings. These
hypotheses can be tested by ascertaining whether granted concessions raise the median level of kidnappings. Since media sources
for the kidnapping data (see below) typically do not report ransom amounts, we have no choice but to use a dummy variable for
negotiation success and/or ransoms paid.4. Data
Our event data source is International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) (Mickolus et al., 2014), which re-
cords only transnational terrorist incidents for 1978–2013. ITERATE draws its data from a host of print, digitalized, and televised
media sources. An overlap of coders, since its inception, ensures coding consistency. For the current study, daily data of terrorist
kidnappings are aggregated into monthly counts. Other terrorist event data sets – Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and RAND –
do not lend themselves to the study of kidnapping dynamics because they do not have negotiation covariates, such as the number
of negotiation successes and the number of ransom payments.5 The interested reader can obtain an earlier version of the paper that contains the full analytical model.
6 The ﬁrst game-theoretic model of kidnapping was by Selten (1977). Our theoretical discussion modiﬁes the model of Lapan and Sandler (1988) by changing the
focus from the time inconsistency of the no-concession pledge to an analysis of the comparative statics (also see Sandler and Enders, 2004). Fink and Pingle (2014) ex-
amined the implications of buying insurance from the potential victim's viewpoint.
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country, casualties, victims' nationalities, and logistical success. Casualties (i.e., killed or injured) are broken down between terror-
ists and others (e.g., victims and ofﬁcials). Logistical success for a kidnapping occurs when the terrorists secure one or more hos-
tages. ITERATE records up to three nationalities for the victims of each attack. We are able to identify the nationalities of 85% of
kidnapping victims. During 1978–2013, kidnappings constitute 12.7% of all transnational terrorist incidents. This relatively small
percentage is indicative of the costliness and riskiness of such attacks. Terrorists most often engage in relatively low-risk and
low-return bombings. ITERATE HOSTAGE ﬁle contains additional information (e.g., negotiation success) on hostage events, includ-
ing kidnappings. We merge the COMMON and HOSTAGE ﬁles and extract monthly information on 1334 kidnappings during
1978–2013.7
Our dependent variable is the number of kidnappings directed at each nationality per month. If a kidnapping includes hostages
with more than one nationality, then the dependent variable assigns the other identiﬁed nationalities to the respective countries.
This dependent variable is then aggregated for three cohorts: (i) the US and UK kidnapping victim count, (ii) the Concessionaires'
kidnapping victim count, and (iii) the EU less UK (henceforth, EU) kidnapping victim count.8 The ten Concessionaire countries are
previously identiﬁed. Given Europe's reputation for conceding, the EU cohort is used as an additional control group, wherein Con-
cessionaires include only eight EU countries so that the overlap between the two cohorts is not great. We must aggregate over
these three cohorts in order to keep the time series sufﬁciently thick to conduct our statistical tests. Even though the underlying
game model is for a single country, the theory applies to groups of countries that follow similar negotiation strategies. As such,
these countries share similar concession reputations in the mind of the terrorists.
We code two covariates. Negotiation success counts the country-speciﬁc monthly number of kidnappings for which the terror-
ists gained some or all of their initial demands, which may include prisoner exchange or other concessions. Receipt of partial de-
mands is deemed a negotiation success because kidnappers often ask for more than they need to release the hostage. This
overstating of demands is true of all bargaining situations. Negotiations would not have concluded were the kidnappers unhappy
with the granted concession. ITERATE codes a negotiation success when the media reports that a concession was granted and the
hostage released. Who pays the concessions is seldom known or reported in the media. Moreover, the amount of a ransom is not
typically indicated since governments do not want potential terrorist kidnappers to know this amount; hence, we must stay with
the number of negotiated successes. A second covariate is the country-speciﬁc monthly count of incidents where the abductors
sustained casualties. Terrorists sustained casualties in 3.4%, 2.6%, and 6.1% of kidnappings for 1978–2013, 2001–2013, and
1978–2000, respectively. These casualties' percentages were much less than those for which casualties were sustained by anyone
— victims, bystanders, the authorities, or the terrorists. The percentages for any casualties in transnational terrorist kidnappings
were 19.5%, 23.0%, and 18.8% for 1978–2013, 2001–2013, and 1978–2000, respectively. The higher percentage in recent time ac-
counts for increased beheadings.
Negotiation successes inﬂuence the terrorists' perceived probability of concession, so that the theory predicts that an additional
negotiation success is expected to lead to more abductions. Additional kidnappings with terrorist casualties serve as a deterrent
proxy for which greater casualties should decrease future kidnappings, except when martyrdom is greatly valued, which should
apply to 2001–2013.
Given the greater adherence by the United States and the United Kingdom to their no-concession pledge since the start of
2001, we are particularly interested in the dynamics of kidnappings for 2001–2013. Marginal increases and decreases in kidnap-
pings are our focus because US–UK citizens will still be kidnapped despite a no-concession policy owing to the high propaganda
and publicity value of such abductions.
5. Methods and variables
Table 1 presents the counts of the main dependent variable, the number of kidnappings for each country for 1978–2013 and
its two sub-periods. Clearly, the United States and the United Kingdom are the greater kidnapping targets over 1978–2013 owing
to terrorists' grievances and their seeking of publicity. Summing over our dependent variable, we ﬁnd a total of 445 US and UK
kidnappings and 489 Concessionaires kidnappings in the top row of Table 1. There were 424 EU (without UK) kidnap victims
for whom 83 concessions were granted. For 1978–2013, the United States and the United Kingdom gave concessions in 19.6%
and 10.7% of their citizens' abductions, respectively, while the EU granted concessions in 19.6% of their citizens' abductions.
The Concessionaires gave concessions for approximately 20.4% of their hostages. For the entire period, the Concessionaires granted
concessions in the greatest percentage of cases, followed by the EU and the United States. The United Kingdom offered the
smallest percentage of concessions.
Theoretically, the implications of our conceptual model regarding the inﬂuence of a negotiation success on kidnappings should
be most compelling for Islamic-based terrorists, who dominate the post-2001 landscape. Given their willingness to become mar-
tyrs, terrorist casualties may have little inﬂuence on deterring kidnappings in the post-2001 period by today's terrorists. Earlier
kidnappings were driven by leftist or state-sponsored interests (Hoffman, 2006). The third and fourth rows of Table 1 show kid-
nap victim and concession counts for the post-2001 (2001–2013) period. After the start of 2001, concession percentages fell to
10.7% for the United States and stayed rather unchanged at 10.4% for the United Kingdom, while these percentages rose to 21%7 Quarterly counts lose important dynamic information, while daily counts are too thin.
8 A kidnapping is considered an EU case based onwhether the listed nationality of the hostage corresponds to an EUmember, according to the accession of the coun-
try to the EU. There are no kidnapping attacks in ITERATE for Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, or Slovakia.
Table 1
Number of kidnappings and negotiation successes by nationality, 1978–2013.
Country US UK France Spain Italy Germany Canada Belgium Netherlands Austria Sweden Switzerland EU
Number of victims (1978–2013) 296 149 112 32 111 80 37 19 23 21 20 34 424
Number of negotiation successes
(1978–2013)
58 16 26 8 13 20 9 3 6 5 4 6 83
Number of victims (post-2001) 84 48 36 6 36 27 18 4 8 1 6 9 142
Number of negotiation successes
(post-2001)
9 5 5 3 8 7 2 1 2 1 1 2 30
Number of victims (pre-2001) 212 101 76 26 75 53 19 15 15 20 12 25 282
Number of negotiation successes
(pre-2001)
49 11 21 5 5 13 7 2 4 4 3 4 53
Source: ITERATE (Mickolus et al., 2014).
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the United Kingdom better adhered to their stated no-concession policy after the start of 2001. Moreover, their adherence was
much better than that of the EU or the Concessionaires. As such, US–UK hostages became relatively less desirable compared to
those from the EU or the Concessionaires for kidnappers driven by concessions to support their organization's operation.
The ﬁfth and sixth rows of Table 1 indicate kidnap victim and concession counts for the pre-2001 (1978–2000) period. During
this period, there were 313 US–UK kidnappings, 302 Concessionaires kidnappings, and 282 EU kidnappings. Clearly, US–UK citi-
zens were favored despite their countries' no-concession stance. During 1978–2000, the United States and the United Kingdom
gave concessions for 23.1% and 10.9% of these kidnappings, respectively, while the EU handed over concessions in 18.8% of
their citizens' abductions. The Concessionaires granted concessions 20.2% of the time. These raw data show that the United
States did not consistently stay with its no-concession pledge before 2001. This was especially true during the 1980s and a
spate of US kidnappings in Lebanon. The United States stayed truer to its pledge after 2001. The raw data, however, do not cap-
ture the underlying dynamics in terms of how a concession can result in a marginal increase above the median level of kidnap-
pings, while accounting for median changepoints. Table 1 is merely an interval-based overview that indicates, among other things,
that Americans were favored kidnap victims, but it does not show how much more favored they were after a concession had been
granted. This will be captured by our dynamic empirical method.
To model empirically the three dependent variable time series – US and UK, EU, and Concessionaires – of monthly kidnap-
pings, we employ a count model. The key predictors are the previously deﬁned counts of the number of negotiation successes
by terrorist kidnappers and the number of kidnappings with abductor casualties. There are multiple possible choices for the
count model speciﬁcation: e.g., Poisson, negative binomial, Poisson autoregressive (PAR(p)), or Poisson changepoint regressions.
Brandt and Sandler (2009, 2010) showed that transnational kidnappings, skyjackings, and other hostage-taking events are
often subject to changes in regime, where the effects of parameters are driven by a changepoint process that alters the effects
of covariates on the type of hostage-taking events (e.g., shifting over time from skyjackings to kidnappings) or the type of target
(e.g., shifting from government ofﬁcials to private parties). Since both types of substitutions can affect the logistical success of kid-
nappings and, thus, the marginal effects of the covariates on the dependent variable over time, it is prudent to not consider a ﬁxed
parameter count regression model (i.e., Poisson, negative binomial, or PAR(p)) and instead employ a changepoint count model.
Regime change can also derive from a change in the nature of the terrorist groups that do the kidnappings — i.e., the growing
dominance of religious fundamental terrorists after the start of 2001.
The Bayesian Poisson changepoint model of Park (2010) is employed. This model ﬁts a Poisson regression that identiﬁes the
number of changepoints in the count time series and estimates different regression parameters via the ﬁltering method of Chib
(1998). For each changepoint segment, a different set of Poisson regression parameters is estimated. The selection of the number
of changepoints is done using a Bayes factor, computed from each changepoint model's marginal likelihood. The Bayes factor givesFig. 1. Changepoints for the EU (without UK) and Concessionaires series, 2001–2013.
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Bayes factors indicate a preference for a model with k changepoints versus a model with k − 1 or k + 1 changepoints.
A priori, the number of changepoints is not known, so models with zero to ﬁve changepoints are ﬁtted for each of the three
dependent variables and the two covariates. The Bayesian changepoint Poisson regressions are sampled with 100,000 burn-in
sweeps, and a ﬁnal posterior of 100,000 draws. The posterior samples pass standard checks for convergence and mixing. Based
on these models' log marginal likelihoods and log Bayes factor comparisons, the best-ﬁtting models are zero changepoints for
the US–UK data, and one changepoint for the EU and Concessionaries series (see online Appendix A). The top portion of Fig. 1
displays the kidnapping time series plots for the EU and the Concessionaires. Fig. 1 also gives the changepoint dates and the pre-
dicted means before and after the changepoint for the latter two series. For the EU series, the predicted changepoint is April 2006,
denoted by 2006(4), and for the Concessionaries, it is April 2008. The EU countries experienced 0.6 kidnappings per month before
2006(4) and 1.1 per month after the changepoint. The Concessionaires were subject to an average of 0.7 kidnappings per month
from 2001 to 2008(4), which then increased to a mean of 1.3 per month. The EU changepoint corresponds to the height of the
terror campaign of al-Zarqawi's al-Qaida in Iraq, while the Concessionaires' changepoint corresponds to the kidnapping campaigns
of AQIM and other religious fundamentalist groups. These groups inspired other terrorist groups to kidnap Europeans and
Americans. In contrast, the mean number of kidnappings per month for the US–UK data was 0.85 per month throughout
2001–2013.
These results indicate that the conditional predictions for the number of kidnappings for the EU and the Concessionaries share
a higher baseline level of kidnappings after their respective changepoints. The Bayesian changepoint model controls for this via
different intercepts and regression slopes, which means that marginal effects or prediction calculations are sensitive to being be-
fore or after the changepoint for the EU and the Concessionaires.
6. Substantive results and interpretations
The posterior coefﬁcient densities for Bayesian Poisson changepoint models are presented in Fig. 2. The ﬁrst column of Fig. 2
gives the estimated posterior densities for the EU model. The black densities are for the ﬁrst EU regime for 2001(1)–2006(3),
while the red densities are for the second EU regime for 2006(4)–2013(12). For comparison purposes, the green densities are
for the US–UK during 2001(1)–2013(12). For the EU model, kidnappings with negotiation success have positive posterior densi-
ties in the ﬁrst and second regimes. The same is true for the US–UK densities displayed in green. These densities indicate that
additional terrorist negotiation successes are positive predictors of kidnappings for the US–UK and the EU, which supports the
contention and prediction of the theoretical discussion that the no-concessions policy lowers the number of kidnappings for
both the US–UK and the EU. Thus, the US–UK will experience fewer kidnappings if they adhere to their no-concession pledge,
while the EU will experience more kidnappings if members do not consistently adhere to their no-concession policy. In the last
row of Fig. 2 for EU Regime 2, terrorist casualties shift the densities in the direction of more kidnappings, consistent with terrorists
valuing martyrdom. In contrast, such casualties reduce US–UK kidnappings.
For the Concessionaries, the second column of Fig. 2 shows the estimated densities of the posterior coefﬁcients across the two
regimes as compared to the corresponding coefﬁcients for the US–UK estimates. The Concessionaires' ﬁrst and second regimes
display positive posterior estimates for negotiation success, thereby indicating that such concessions lead to more kidnappings
for the Concessionaires. The posterior coefﬁcient densities for terrorist casualties' covariates in the Concessionaires model cover
zero for Regime 1, indicating no real deterrent effects for these covariates on the number of Concessionaires' kidnappings. This
absence of an effect will be better seen later in Table 2. For Regime 2, terrorist casualties appear to result in more kidnappings
of Concessionaires' citizens, indicating a negative deterrent, consistent with martyrdom. Kidnapper casualties' posterior densities
are shifted in the negative direction for the US–UK model, indicating that such casualties depress the number of US–UK kidnap-
pings. As such, some deterrence is detected.
To better convey the substantive effects of changes in the covariates on the number of kidnappings, we conduct a posterior
prediction exercise. Employing our posterior sample of 100,000 values of the coefﬁcients, we construct the conditional expecta-
tions of the number of predicted kidnappings over the full US and UK sample, and over the two subsamples for the EU and Con-
cessionaries, deﬁned by their changepoints. For these conditional expectations, we estimate the net change in the number of
kidnappings for a change in a single covariate. For, say, negotiation success, no negotiation is coded with a 0 and its predicted
count densities are then compared to those of a negotiation success, coded with a 1. When we conduct this exercise for each co-
variate, other covariates are held at their in-sample and in-segment values to isolate the effect of the additional number of nego-
tiation successes and incidents with terrorist casualties. The full posterior sample of 100,000 draws is used to compute the
conditional posterior predictive density for these one-unit changes in the covariates. We present these predictions in a series of
box-plots for each regime of each dependent variable data series.
Fig. 3 shows box-plots of the predictions for no negotiation success compared to one negotiation success (holding the other
covariates constant at their in-sample and in-segment values). As seen in the left panel, when there is no negotiation success,
the median number of US–UK kidnappings is predicted to be 0.80. Median kidnappings increase to 1.48 or by 87% when there
is an incident with negotiation success [see online Appendix A, Tables A4, for the details of the median estimates and their cred-
ible intervals (CIs)]. For EU Regime 1, there is a discernible positive effect of granting a negotiation success, since the medians are
0.62 and 1.01 kidnappings before and after an additional negotiation success. This ﬁve-year regime is before the rise of AQIM,
AQAP, al-Shabaab, and other signiﬁcant kidnapping threats. From 2006(4) onward in Regime 2, the effects of negotiation success
are larger on EU kidnappings. If there is no negotiation success, the median predicted number of kidnappings is 0.62; with a
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across both regimes. In the Regime 1 for 2001(1)–2008(3), the predicted median number of Concessionaires kidnappings is
0.67 when there is no negotiation success, but the median increases to 1.22 kidnappings following a terrorist negotiation success.Fig. 2. Posterior estimated coefﬁcients densities for the US–UK, EU, and Concessionaires.
Table 2
Percentage change in kidnapping predictions, negotiations and terrorist casualties, 2001–2013.
Negotiation success Terrorist casualties
Median % Δ 5% 95% Median % Δ 5% 95%
US–UK 87 22 157 −25 −51 2
EU, Regime 1 64 30 100 −3 −50 50
EU, Regime 2 80 43 119 209 −16 604
Concessionaires, Regime 1 82 34 136 −21 −62 26
Concessionaires, Regime 2 72 33 109 146 −43 556
Notes: EU Regime 1: 2001(1)–2006(3); EU Regime 2: 2006(4)–2013(12); Concessionaires Regime 1: 2001(1)–2008(3); Concessionaires Regime 2: 2008(4)–
2013(12).
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success by the terrorists.
Table 2 uses these posterior predictions from the changes in the negotiation success to compute the percentage changes in the
number of expected kidnappings for each of the three time series. The median predicted percentage change and its 90% CI is re-
ported in Table 2. For the US–UK data, one additional negotiation success yields 87% more kidnappings with a 90% CI between 22%
and 157%. For the EU before 2006(4), the median increase in kidnappings following a negotiation success is 64% with a 90% CI
between 30% and 100%. After 2006(4), the EU median increase following a negotiation success is 80% with a 90% CI between
43% and 119%. For the Concessionaires, an additional negotiation success is associated with 82% and 72% more kidnappings for
Regimes 1 and 2, respectively. These results strongly support the theoretical prediction that negotiation success induces more kid-
nappings of capitulating countries' citizens. For all ﬁve cases, the CI does not include zero, making the estimates statistically
signiﬁcant.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the median number of predicted kidnappings when there are incidents without or with terrorist casual-
ties, holding everything else constant across the regimes. An additional kidnapping with terrorist casualties has the anticipated
deterrent for the US–UK by reducing the median prediction from 0.81 to 0.61 kidnappings (see online Appendix A, Table A5,
for details of these predictions and their CIs). In Fig. 4, there is virtually no deterrent effect for EU Regime 1 and Concessionaires
Regime 1 following an incident with terrorist casualties. The largest changes are increases from 0.80 to 2.63 incidents and from
0.89 to 2.46 incidents for EU Regime 2 and Concessionaires Regime 2, respectively, following abduction with terrorist casualties.
These results suggest the draw of martyrdom in the most recent regimes. Returning to Table 2, these ﬁndings are put in better
perspective. Only the median fall of 25% for US–UK is very close to being signiﬁcant with the 90% CI running from −51% to
2%, thereby just barely containing zero. The other four cases are not signiﬁcant, given the inclusion of zero in their CIs. We
must conclude that harm inﬂicted on the abductors of EU and Concessionaires hostages is not a deterrent since 9/11. This is
also true for our analysis involving violent ends — i.e., shoot-outs with the authorities (results available upon request). These
violent-end results display an insigniﬁcant increase in the median following a shoot-out.7. Robustness checks
ITERATE records the HOSTAGE covariate information on negotiation success and terrorist casualties for 1978–2013. As a check
on the robustness of our results and any sensitivity to the 2001–2013 timeframe, we extended the data and conducted similarFig. 3. Marginal effects of one additional negotiation success on the number of kidnappings.
Fig. 4. Marginal effects of one additional incident with terrorist casualties on the number of kidnappings.
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gous set of results for 1978–2013 to those presented here for the post-2000 era.
Given the larger 1978–2013 sample, different changepoints are estimated. Using the same procedure described earlier, we ﬁnd
that there are no changepoints in the extended US–UK series, one changepoint for the EU without UK series and one changepoint
for the Concessionaires. The EU changepoint comes in 1983(3), which corresponds to a monthly mean increase from 0.3 to 1.1
abductions prior to the kidnapping campaign in Lebanon. The Concessionaires' changepoint occurs about the same time in
1983(2) when the monthly mean rose from 0.4 to 1.2 abductions.
Qualitatively similar results to those seen above for terrorist negotiation success hold for 1978–2013. For the US–UK, granting
concessions increased the median number of incidents by 26% with a 90% CI between 9% and 45% — see Table 3. The smaller effect
is due to these countries not maintaining their pledge as rigorously as since 2001. In Table 3, there is no overlap of the 90% CIs
with zero for the effects of terrorist negotiation success for EU Regime 2 and Concessionaires Regime 2, where 55% (CI between
39% and 71%) and 57% (CI between 42% and 72%) more kidnappings, respectively, are predicted when concessions are granted.
The insigniﬁcance of the ﬁndings for negotiation success for Regime 1 for the EU and the Concessionaires is not surprising
given the brevity of these ﬁrst regimes and countries not making clear their concession policy in kidnappings.
In Table 3, terrorist casualties have no deterrent effect throughout 1978–2013 for the US–UK, the EU regimes, or the Conces-
sionaires regimes. The 90% CIs include zero in all ﬁve cases.
For completeness, we also investigated the dynamics of our two-covariate model for 1978–2000. Our analysis gives one
changepoint for the US–UK at 1993(5), one changepoint for the EU at 1983(4), and one changepoint for the Concessionaires
also at 1983(4). For the US–UK, the mean for kidnappings goes from 0.9 to 1.5 incidents after the changepoint. For the EU, the
kidnapping mean goes from 0.3 to 1.2; while, for the Concessionaires, the kidnapping mean goes from 0.5 to 1.4 (see online Ap-
pendix C for the details of the 1978–2000 runs). Table 4 summarizes our main ﬁndings. The US–UK experienced no signiﬁcant
change in the kidnapping median after a negotiation success, probably due to US inconsistent adherence to its no-concession
pledge for the pre-2001 period. There are, however, signiﬁcant consequences for the EU and the Concessionaires when conces-
sions were granted during their longer Regime 2. In Table 4, each concession in Regime 2 augmented the mean number of kid-
nappings by 48% and 46% for the EU and Concessionaires, respectively. These percentage increases are markedly lower than for
2001–2013, thus indicating that concessions since 2001 generate more kidnappings. Terrorist casualties do not have a signiﬁcant
deterrent or inducement for future kidnappings. This is consistent with terrorists being less driven by martyrdom prior to 2001.Table 3
Percentage change in kidnapping predictions, negotiations and terrorist casualties, 1978–2013.
Negotiation success Terrorist casualties
Median % Δ 5% 95% Median % Δ 5% 95%
US–UK 26 9 45 1 −16 17
EU, Regime 1 54 −45 175 −7 −95 125
EU, Regime 2 55 39 71 16 −8 41
Concessionaires, Regime 1 56 −16 134 −53 −96 15
Concessionaires, Regime 2 57 42 72 7 −14 31
Notes: EU Regime 1: 1978(1)–1983(2); EU Regime 2: 1983(3)–2013(12); Concessionaires Regime 1: 1978(1)–1983(1); Concessionaires Regime 2: 1983(2)–
2013(12).
Table 4
Percentage change in kidnapping predictions, negotiations and terrorist casualties, 1978–2000.
Negotiation success Terrorist casualties
Median % Δ 5% 95% Median % Δ 5% 95%
US–UK, Regime 1 12 −22 57 21 −23 67
US–UK, Regime 2 4 −29 32 24 −31 78
EU, Regime 1 54 −46 172 10 −94 146
EU, Regime 2 48 25 71 11 −17 42
Concessionaires, Regime 1 54 −17 134 −37 −94 38
Concessionaires, Regime 2 46 27 64 6 −21 33
Notes: US–UK Regime 1: 1978(1)–1993(4); US–UK Regime 2: 1993(5)–2000(12); EU Regime 1: 1978(1)–1983(3); EU Regime 2: 1983(4)–2000(12); Concession-
aires Regime 1: 1978(1)–1983(3); Concessionaires Regime 2: 1983(4)–2000(12).
51P.T. Brandt et al. / European Journal of Political Economy 44 (2016) 41–528. Concluding remarks
Even in the United States, the debate still rages over the US stated no-concession policy for terrorist kidnappers. The debate
has become more poignant following the beheadings of hostages by al-Qaida in Iraq, ISIS, and other groups, and the statements
by the murdered hostages' families. The no-concession policy rules out the swapping of prisoners or other concessions in lieu of
ransoms. With few notable exceptions, the United States and the United Kingdom have maintained their no-concession policy
since 2001.9 In this paper, we use Bayesian time series analysis and observations on terrorist kidnappings from 2001 through
2013 to ascertain the empirical consequences of terrorist kidnappers' negotiation success. We provide strong evidence that terror-
ist negotiation success results in more hostages being abducted because of terrorists' anticipated future payoffs, consistent with
our conceptual model's predictions. These ﬁndings are bolstered by our robustness analysis for 1978–2013 and 1978–2000,
when withholding concessions deterred kidnappings. By toeing the line, the United States and the United Kingdom eliminate a
marginal increase in the median rate of kidnappings of their citizens by 87% for 2001–2013. This refers to a median increase in
hostage taking; however, it does not imply, as suggested by David Cohen at the outset of the paper, that US citizens will not be
taken hostage. Unfortunately, US and UK citizens will still be taken hostage because of terrorists' grievances and their anticipated
media attention from such abductions. Nevertheless, limiting an increase in the median rate of abductions is a huge beneﬁt, given
the marginal effects on future kidnappings identiﬁed here, and greatly supports the continuation of these countries' no-concession
policy. By granting concessions, the EU and the Concessionaire countries increased median kidnappings of their citizens by 80%
and 72% after 2006(4) and 2008(4), respectively. Our analysis with its unique data set on kidnappings represents the ﬁrst dynam-
ic quantitative analysis of the consequences of conceding to terrorist kidnappers' demands for 2001–2013, 1978–2013, and
1978–2000, distinguished by those countries that generally adhere to their no-concession pledge versus those that do not.
Given the religious fanaticism of many of today's terrorist kidnappers, it is not surprising that terrorist casualties had no sig-
niﬁcant deterrent effect over the 2001–2013 and 1978–2013 sample periods for the EU and Concessionaires. The primary deter-
rence stemmed from terrorist casualties inﬂicted by the authorities in kidnappings involving US–UK hostages during 2001–2013.
Our study solely analyzes terrorist kidnappings, as identiﬁed by the ITERATE data set. This data set does not record criminal
kidnappings that do not have a political motive. In addition, ITERATE does not include ship hijackings for ransoms, which also
do not have a political motive. Thus, our ﬁndings cannot be generalized to these other situations for which governments may
be more permissive with respect to private parties paying ransoms. Moreover, as one referee pointed out, terrorist kidnappings
may fall with respect to no-concession countries if their citizens avoid dangerous venues (e.g., Syria), knowing the dire conse-
quences from being taken hostage. Nevertheless, this should be a favorable outcome of the no-concession policy by limiting future
abductions.Acknowledgments
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